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AN UNFIRM FOUNDATION: THE REGRETTABLE
INDEFENSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
FrederickMark Gedicks"
Therefore, whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth
them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a
rock:
And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew,
and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a
rock.
And everyone that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them
not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the
sand:
And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew,
and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it.
Matthew 7:24-27 (King James).
"Better is half a loaf than no bread."
John Heywood (1497-1530)

I. INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION WITHOUT AN ANSWER

Consider the following hypotheticals:
A church and a secular nonprofit organization both want to operate a
homeless shelter in violation of local zoning regulations. What would be
the justification for granting the church an exemption from the regulations,
but not the secular nonprofit?
A pro-life Roman Catholic attorney is assigned by a court to represent an
indigent pregnant teen seeking an abortion without parental notification in a state
with a judicial bypass procedure. An African American attorney is assigned to
represent a group of indigent white supremacists who have been denied a permit
to demonstrate in a city park. Assuming that the state's ethical rules do not
permit either attorney to decline the representation, and assuming further that
both attorneys prefer to decline the representation for the obvious reasons, what
would be the justification for granting a constitutional exemption from the rule
to the Roman Catholic, but not to the African American?

* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. I am indebted to Sylvan Morley for
research assistance.
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A Sabbatarian refuses to work on Saturday for religious reasons. An agnostic
refuses to work on Saturday because he is a noncustodial parent, and Saturday
is the only day his children are available to visit him. What would be the
justification for constitutionally excusing the Sabbatarian from the obligation to
make herself available for work as a condition to receiving unemployment
benefits, but not the noncustodial parent?
A variety ofjustifications for religious exemptions have long been offered
under the Free Exercise Clause. Some have argued that such exemptions are
necessary to implement the First Amendment's textual guarantee of free
exercise of religion,' or that exemptions form part of the original understanding
of this guarantee.' Others have argued that the pain suffered by believers when
forced to obey laws that violate their faith is greater or different than that
suffered by nonbelievers who are forced to violate secular moral convictions.'
Still others have offered policy justifications for exemptions, arguing that they
are necessary to keep the peace or to eliminate religious persecution,4 or to
encourage and protect an inherently good activity. 5 My thesis is that these
various justifications are no longer plausible, and thus can no longer account
for religious exemptions. In the face of increasing scrutiny and growing
criticism,6 these justifications no longer persuasively explain why religious
people are constitutionally entitled to exemptions from laws that burden their
religious practices, but non-religious people are not entitled to exemptions from
laws that burden personal moral commitments as serious as religion, such as
eliminating poverty, opposing racism, or caring for one's children.
I will begin by surveying these various justifications for religious
exemptions and explaining why I believe they no longer possess explanatory
power.7 If this part of the thesis is correct, then the most obvious response is
to develop a new justification for religious exemptions, one that does its proper
1. See infra Part II-A.
2. See infra Part II-B.
3. See infra Part Il-C.
4. See infra Part I-D.
5. See infra Part I1-E.
6. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the
Accommodation of Religion under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L.
REV. 75 (1990); William P. Marshall, In Defense ofSmith and FreeExercise Revisionism, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall, Free Exercise Revisionism]; William P.
Marshall, The Caseagainst the ConstitutionallyCompelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1990) [hereinafter Marshall, Constitutionally Compelled Exemption];
Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: ParadoxRedux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123 (1992); Mark V.
Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise, 1993 BYU L. REV. 117 (1993); Ellis West, The Case
Against a Right to Religion-BasedExemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 591
(1990).
7. See infra Part II.
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explanatory work in contemporary legal culture. In the second part of this
essay, I suggest that the commitment of contemporary legal culture (and,
indeed, of American society) to equality will likely prevent the success of any
such effort.8 I will close with the suggestion that we abandon the effort to
defend religious exemptions and look elsewhere for doctrine to protect the free
exercise of religion.9
I come to this conclusion reluctantly. Although I was skeptical of the
usefulness of exemptions in the past, I became convinced that they provided
a significant increment of protection for religious practice against government
interference. As one who values religious liberty as an independent good, I
was not pleased either with Employment Division v. Smith Yo abandonment of
the exemption doctrine, or with City ofBoerne v. Flores's" invalidation of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.' 2 Consequently, I emphasize that I am not
urging the abandonment of exemptions on the basis of a normative argument,
but rather for the pragmatic reason that they can no longer be justified with the
theoretical resources available in late 20th century legal culture.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS THAT

No LONGER JUSTIFY

Many of the justifications for religious exemptions have a belated quality.
Consider, for example, Zorach v. Clawson, 3 a decision from the early 1950s
in which Justice Douglas concluded that so-called "released time" programs of
religious instruction do not violate the Establishment Clause.' 4 These programs
excuse religious students in public schools from mandatory attendance
requirements several times a week so that they might attend religious
instruction taking place elsewhere, off of the public school campus; those not
attending the off-campus instruction must remain in school. (My elementary
school in New Jersey had such a program. Every Wednesday afternoon, most
of my classmates left for "church school," leaving behind the Jews, the
Quakers, and me.)
In defending released-time programs against the Establishment Clause
challenge, Justice Douglas argued, "We are a religious people whose
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
496 U.S. 913 (1990).
117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).

12. I was a co-author of the amicus brief filed by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints in Boerne in support of RFRA. This essay does not reflect my reconsideration of the
arguments set forth in the brief, but my judgment that they are not likely to prevail in the
current judicial and political climate.
13. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
14. See id.
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institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."' 5 Now, however persuasive a
starting point this may have been in 1952, I suggest that this is not a good
foundation for a defense of released-time programs in 1998. Justice Douglas's
statement presupposes a society that is not only religiously (if
nondenominationally) pious, but which sees no constitutional problems in
16
government's adjusting its programs and functions to encourage such piety.
This normative conception of church and state is no longer widely held by the
judges, lawyers, academics, and other professionals who make up the legal
community in the United States. While contemporary Americans remain a
religious people, this fact has little cash value in the economy of church-state
relations regulated by American legal culture. 7 Consequently, opinions like
Zorach have an anachronistic flavor, failing to persuade as they once did,
because history has undermined the acceptability of their premises. This is my
point. An examination of various justifications for religious exemptions
reveals that these justifications no longer account for the unique benefit
accorded to believers by religious exemptions.
A.

Text

One of the most frequently invoked justifications for religious exemptions
is the enumeration of the free exercise of religion in the First Amendment:
"Congress shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Citing the text in this manner is a bit like
answering a preschooler's unrelenting question, "Why?," with, "Because I said
so." Like the exasperated parent who has been asked the same question too
many times, free exercise textualists account for religious exemptions by
15. Id. at 313-14.
16. 1 have elsewhere labeled this view of church/state relations "religious
communitarianism," and suggested that it was the dominant ideological paradigm for such
relations in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America. See FREDERICK MARK
GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 11-18 (1995).

17. Professor Berg properly criticizes me for having suggested in the oral presentation of
this essay that Justice Douglas's language lacks cash value in American society generally. See
Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Litigation, 20 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 715 (1998). That was an exaggeration, though perhaps not so large a one as

he assumes. It is far from clear that the religious devotion that many Americans exhibit in their
private lives invariably leads to support for religious exemptions. See, e.g., Jay Alan Sekulow
& John Tuskey, City of Boerne v. Flores: The Justices Know Best, 2 NEXUS 51, 52-53 (Fall
1997) (arguing that the significance of Boerne "is not its effect on religious liberty," but the
Court's endorsement of "judicial supremacy at the expense of congressional prerogative.");
Phillip E. Johnson, Afterword, 2 NEXUS 169, 173 (Fall 1997) (observing that many
conservative Christians were reluctant to defend RFRA "at the cost of establishing a principle
that federal judges have a power to exempt an open-ended category of 'religious activities' from
nondiscriminatory regulations which other citizens must obey.").
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insisting that the First Amendment singles out religious exercise for special
protection. Professor Laycock, for example, argues that
[flor whatever reason, the Constitution does give special protection to
liberty in the domain of religion, and we cannot repudiate that decision
without rejecting an essential feature of constitutionalism, rendering all
constitutional rights vulnerable to repudiation if they go out of favor.
'Because the Constitution says so, and because all our liberties depend on
maintaining the authority of the Constitution's guarantees,' should be
sufficient reason to vigorously protect religious liberty. 8
This begs the question. It does not follow from the enumeration of
religious exercise among the rights protected by the First Amendment that
religious exemptions are constitutionally required. There are plenty of
individual rights and interests specified in the text of the Constitution to which
the Supreme Court gives little meaningful protection. This may be because the
Court views these rights as judicially unenforceable, 9 or because it has
traditionally construed the scope of the right in accordance with the narrowest
possible reading of the text,20 or because the Court believes that, notwithstanding textual enumeration of the rights, deference is owed to actions by the
majoritarian political branches that burden these rights." The mere fact that a
18. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 313, 314
(1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty]. See also Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation ofReligion: An Update and Response to the Critics,60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
685, 717 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation of Religion] (The kind of "favoritism
toward religion" that protects "religious freedom more than the freedom to conduct oneself in
accordance with nonreligious norms" is "inherent in the very text of the First Amendment.");
Stephen Pepper, ConflictingParadigmsofReligious Liberty, 1993 BYU L. REV. 7, 12 ("On its

face, the [text of the free exercise clause] grants a unique advantage to religious conduct,
protecting it from government imposition.").
19. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (guarantee clause of Article IV); Luther
v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7. How.) 1 (1849). Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 210 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment does not protect federally
enforceable rights) with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated rights such as the right to
marital privacy).
20. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (privileges and
immunities clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
21. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See generally LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1958); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine ofJudicial

Review, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). Professor Lupu suggests that the demise of the exemption
doctrine may have been the result of the tension between the activist judicial philosophy
implied by the exemption doctrine and the more restrained judicial philosophy of the mostly
conservative judges appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush. See Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble
with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 754 (1992) [hereinafter Lupu, The Trouble
with Accommodation].
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free exercise right is enumerated in the constitutional text does not mean that
holders of the right are constitutionally entitled to be excused from complying
with government action that incidentally burdens the right.
The textualist argument for religious exemptions is particularly problematic. The appearance of "prohibit" in the Free Exercise Clause suggests as
much the anti-discrimination meaning given the clause by Employment
Division v. Smith22 as it does the exemption doctrine imposed by Sherbert v.
Vernei 3 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.24 As Professor Marshall has pointed out, the
framers' explicit reference to religion in the First Amendment "reflects the fact
that religious groups had often been persecuted and therefore needed special
protection. The text, in short, is consistent with protecting religion from
discrimination; it does not compel discrimination in favor of religion., 25 At
best, the text of the Free Exercise Clause is ambiguous with respect to
exemptions, 26tht"
meaning that the justification for religious exemptions must lie
elsewhere.
B.

History

Closely related to the textual argument is the historical one, that those who
lived at the time of the ratification of the First Amendment in 1791 or the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 understood the Free Exercise Clause to
mandate exemptions. With respect to the framers of the First Amendment,27
evidence for this hypothesis is scarce, and many scholars have rejected it.
After an exhaustive review of colonial history, even so strong a supporter of
exemptions as Professor McConnell was able to conclude only that exemptions
were not unknown to the people of that time, and thus is not inconsistent an
original understanding of the free exercise clause that encompassed exemp-

22. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. Marshall, FreeExercise Revisionism, supra note 6, at 325.
It is not enough ... to say that the Constitution gives religion special protection. No
one is contesting that point .... What is at issue, rather, is how much protection the
Constitution gives religion and, more specifically, whether it guarantees a right on
the part of religious individuals and groups to religion-based exemptions.
West, supra note 6, at 621-22.
26. See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 18, at 690.
27. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS (1978); STEvEN D. SMITH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE chs. 2-4 (1995); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise
Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 245, 261-306 (1991);
Phillip Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight of Religious Exemption: An HistoricalPerspective,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992); West, supra note 6, at 623-33.
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tions.2" Justice Scalia was right to count this as evidence againstthe historical
validity of exemptions. 29
The originalist case for exemptions in connection with the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the application of the Bill of Rights against the
states is stronger. Professor Lash has argued that some members of the
Reconstruction Congress intended the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
section one to impose upon the states an understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause that encompassed exemptions.3 0 One scholar has questioned Lash's
conclusions, 3 however, and the fact remains that barely ten years after the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, Reynolds v. United States 2 decisively
rejected the argument that the Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions. 3
In fact, the constitutional history of the Free Exercise Clause is almost
Every appellate court that had
completely against religious exemptions.
occasion to interpret the Free Exercise Clause in the decades following the
ratification of the First Amendment concluded that it did not mandate
In the late 19th century Reynolds and the other Mormon
exemptions,3
polygamy cases repeatedly emphasized that the clause did not excuse religious
practitioners from complying with otherwise legitimate laws, even when those
laws prevented them from practicing their faith. 35 This remained the rule well
into the twentieth century.36 Mark Galanter once reported that in a survey of
court decisions prior to 1940, he was unable to find a single one in which a
violation of the criminal law was excused because of the defendant's religious

28. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1414-15 (1990). Even this modest conclusion
was sharply attacked as methodologically unsound by Mark Tushnet. See Tushnet, supranote
6, at 124-27.
29. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172-73 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. See Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions under the FourteenthAmendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106 (1994). Lash concurs
with those scholars who argue that mandatory exemptions formed no part of the 1791
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 1110-18.
31. See SMITH, supra note 27, at 50-54.
32.

98 U.S. 145 (1878).

33. See id. at 164, 166-67. Because Reynolds involved a prosecution of polygamy in Utah
Territory, however, questions about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
significance of incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause against the states did not arise.
34. See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 125.
35. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885);
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164, 166-67.
36. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601-01 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
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motivation. 7 From the standpoint of history, then, the aberrations are Sherbert
and Yoder, not Smith.
C.

Transcendent Consequences

Some have argued that religious exemptions are justified by certain unique
consequences of believing in God. Disobeying God subjects believers to
divine punishment in the life hereafter; nonbelievers do not fear such
punishments because they do not believe in an extra-temporal existence beyond
this life. 8 When government action forces believers to disobey the commands
of their God, they suffer a psychological harm to which nonbelievers are not
subject.3 9 Exemptions eliminate for believers a "conflict of loyalties" not faced
by nonbelievers.4"
This justification is substantially over- and under-inclusive. Many of
those who profess belief in God deny the reality of extra-temporal punishment
for disobeying his commands.4 On the other hand, as Professor Marshall has
observed, "[t]he violation of deeply held moral or political principles may
cause as much psychic harm to the believer as would a violation of a religious
tenet, even if the latter is believed to have extra-temporal consequences. 42
Certainly it is conceivable that an African American who is forced to represent
a racist feels a psychological or emotional distress similar to that felt by an
orthodox Roman Catholic who is forced to represent a teenager seeking an
abortion.4 3 Likewise, the injustice and bitterness that might be experienced by
37. See Marc Galanter, Religious Freedomsin the UnitedStates: A TurningPoint?, 1966
WIs. L. REv. 216, 234.
38. See John H. Garvey, An Anti-LiberalArgumentfor Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 275, 286-87 (1996) [hereinafter Garvey, An Anti-LiberalArgument].
39. See id. at 288.
40. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at A Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
115, 125 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Religious Freedom]. See also Ira C. Lupu, To Control
Factionand ProtectLiberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 357, 359 (1996) [hereinafter Lupu, A General Theory] ("To be insensitive to the pain
of those forced to choose between religious faith and the norms of the wider community is
cruel.").
41. See Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The
Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1085-87 (1996)
[hereinafter Laycock, Continuityand Change] (summarizing poll data). See also West, supra
note 6, at 615 ("[Tlhere are many religious persons whose behavior is not influenced by a belief
in the after life or by concern with punishments of any sort.").
42. Marshall, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 6, at 321. Elsewhere Professor
Marshall has suggested that the fear of extra-temporal punishment makes believers especially
prone to extremism and violence, and thus justifies more stringent regulation of religion, rather
than its special protection. See William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS
L. REV. 843 (1993).
43. Cf Marshall, Free Exercise Exemption, supra note 6, at 384 ("A person has a secular
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one who is denied unemployment benefits when she leaves a job rather than
violate her Sabbath do not seem different in kind or intensity from those that
might be suffered by a noncustodial parent who is denied benefits when he
leaves a job so as to be free to visit his children."
In the end, the contemporary liberal commitment to individual autonomy
makes it unlikely that government interference with religious conscience will
be understood as a serious harm distinct from interference with secular
conscience. The commitment to autonomy protects individual choice for its
own sake; the value is in the freedom to choose, not in the object of choice.45
As a result, the constitutional harm that results when government interferes
with autonomy is less the substantive harm that follows from the choice
imposed upon the individual than the procedural harm of denying the
individual the opportunity to choose. This leaves the liberal theory unable to
distinguish between religious practices and any secular lifestyle choice,4
including a choice motivated by personal commitment to a secular morality.47
Without this distinction, however, it is difficult to argue that the transcendent
or extra-temporal consequences of religious belief entitle believers to
exemption from morally burdensome laws when nonbelievers are left subject
to them.
D.

Preventing Violence and Persecution

The Supreme Court has long interpreted the Constitution in terms of the
Court's own views about good social policy, regardless of the teachings of text
and history. Accordingly, religious exemptions might be justified because they
lead to socially desirable results. One such argument proceeds from the
premise that conflicts over religious belief are particularly violent and
moral objection to killing in war and a religious objection to working on the Sabbath might well
suffer greater psychic harm in being forced to kill than in being forced to work.").
44.

Cf.Marshall, Free Exercise Exemption, supra note 6, at 383 (noting that the same

unemployment compensation appeals board that denied benefits to a religious pacifist who
refused to work in an armaments factory also denied benefits to a person who was unavailable
for work due to strong convictions about parental obligations).
45. See Garvey, An Anti-LiberalArgument, supra note 38, at 276.
46. See, e.g., Garvey, An Anti-LiberalArgument, supra note 38, at 278 (describing the

autonomy justification for religious freedom as placing "religious choices ...on a par with
promiscuous sex, cigarette smoking, and the practice of optometry").
47. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (statute exempting
religious pacifists from military service held to cover "those whose consciences, by deeply held
moral, ethical or religious beliefs, would give them no rest if they allowed themselves to
become part of an instrument of war"); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965)
(statute exempting those with anti-war convictions motivated by "belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being" held to cover those whose moral or philosophical convictions occupy a place
in their lives comparable to that occupied by God in the lives of believers).
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disruptive of social order, and that giving religion special protection avoids this
violence and disruption.48
One major difficulty with this argument is that it provides no justification
for protecting marginal religious groups which government could easily
suppress without any threat to social order.49 Peace and order are only
seriously threatened when government seeks to suppress a large or influential
religious minority. The broad, even radical, pluralism that now characterizes
religious belief and practice in the United States suggests the improbability of
this kind of socially disruptive persecution. This is not to minimize or ignore
what Professor Laycock has called three of the worst religious persecutions in
American history---those against Mormons, Roman Catholics, and Jehovah's
Witnesses.50 But as vicious and wrong as these and other religious persecutions
were in the United States, they did not disrupt the social fabric of the country.
They caused tremendous difficulty for their victims, but they did not at any
time threaten the destructive and violent anarchy that characterized Reformation Europe.
Ironically, the most socially disruptive period in recent American history,
the 1960s, was situated in the middle of the heyday of the exemption doctrine.
That the upheavals of the 1960s had little to do with religion and were hardly
ameliorated by the exemption doctrine tells us, I think, why this justification
no longer works: There is nothing about religious belief and practice in
contemporary America that is uniquely disruptive of the social order.5
Still, what about persecution of religious minorities in the United States
that continues to occur? Though its victims are not sufficiently numerous to
threaten social order when they resist, is this nonetheless an independent
justification for religious exemptions? 52 It is indisputable that intentional
48. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195
(1992). See also Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "'Tests " under the
Religion Clauses, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 323, 341 ("In general, religious beliefs and practices
place demands on people that are more intense, less subject to reasons that regulate civil society,
more likely to generate conflicts with the state if not accommodated, than do nonreligious
beliefs and practices."); Lupu, A General Theory, supra note 40, at 360-61, 363-64 (arguing
that religious belief creates unusual risks of political faction). Professor Laycock rejects this
justification, arguing that the evil of the Reformations Wars was not disruption of the social
order by religion, but state imposition of religious beliefs and practices on dissenters. See
Laycock, Continuity and Change, supranote 41, at 1091-93.
49. See Garvey, An Anti-LiberalArgument, supra note 38, at 281-82.
50. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REv.
221, 222-24.
51. For an argument that religion has not been especially violent in Western history
relative to secular ideologies and movements, see FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS & ROGER
HENDRIX, CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FuTURE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE ch.

9

(1991).
52. See, e.g., Laycock, Continuityand Change, supra note 41, at 1089-91, 1094-95. See
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disadvantaging of religious people on the basis of their faith continues to occur
in the United States, although these days it usually takes the form of nonviolent
discrimination or hostile indifference. 53 The burden of justifying religious
exemptions, however, is not discharged by identifying instances of religious
persecution that exemptions might alleviate. A justification for exemptions
must establish not only that exemptions provide protection from religious
discrimination, but also that religious people are entitled to extraordinary
protection against discrimination when victims of comparable discrimination
are not.
For example, proof of the disproportionate racial impact of government
action does not by itself establish a violation of the equal protection clause. 4
In order to prove such a violation, the plaintiff must show that the disproportionate impact was intended, that the action which disproportionately burdens
racial minorities was taken because of,rather than in spite of,this burden.55 As
Professor Marshall has pointed out, "[n]ormally ...concerns of disproportionate impact do not support constitutional claims unless there is also an improper
intent."56 What would be the justification for excusing religious plaintiffs from
proving that discriminatory intent lies behind religiously disproportionate
government action, while African Americans-whose enslaved ancestors are
the principal reason we have an equal protection clause at all-must prove such
intent in case of government action that disproportionately burdens their
interests?
It now appears that even so-called "benign" racial classifications, those
with which a political majority chooses to burden itself in order to mitigate the
effects of centuries of chattel slavery and racial discrimination against African
Americans, are nevertheless subject to strict scrutiny. 57 Is there ajustification
for subjecting religious exemptions, a kind of religious affirmative action, to
also McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 18, at 691 ("Just as the Establishment
Clause is more than a ban on a compulsory official church, the Free Exercise Clause is more
than a ban on the Inquisition.").
53. See, e.g., Church of the Lakumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cem. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). See also McConnell, Religious
Freedom,supra note 40, at 134 ("The Religion Clause jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger
era was . . .characterized by a hostility or indifference to religion, manifested in a weak
application of free exercise doctrine and an aggressive application of an establishment doctrine
systematically weighted in favor of the secular and against genuine religious pluralism.").
54. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).
55. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265-70 (1977).
56. Marshall, FreeExercise Revisionism, supra note 6, at 318.
57. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995). See also City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Kennedy, JJ.); Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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a lesser level of scrutiny?"8 I submit that as bad as things have been for many
religious groups in the United States, none can claim to have had a worse
experience with persecution and discrimination than African Americans. It will
be difficult to justify religious exemptions after the Court has rejected the
legitimacy of comparable legislative actions designed to provide redress to
African Americans and other racial minorities for the adverse consequences of
government action that was every bit as serious as religious persecution.
E.

"God is Good"

Professor Garvey maintains that religion is a unique contributor to social
good in the United States with which government should not interfere. From
this premise, Garvey argues that the establishment clause should permit
government to remove general disincentives to religious activity by funding it
neutrally with secular activities, and that the free exercise clause should require
government to remove direct obstacles to religious activity imposed by laws
which burden such activity, by exempting believers from the obligation to
comply with such laws. 59
A great virtue of Garvey's position is that it does provide an answer to the
question why we grant religion strong protections that we do not grant to other
kinds of comparable, morally serious behavior. We do so, Garvey argues,
because religion is a uniquely valuable human activity: "The First Amendment
is not part of an integrated system for promoting human autonomy. It protects60
certain kinds of activities because those are especially good things to do.",
Garvey points out,
[L]iberal theory has a hard time explaining why we should exempt people
who were making religious choices, but not people who were pursuing
other kinds of personal interests. Since all choices are equal in the eyes of
the law, we should not show special consideration to one set. My theory
does not face this conflict. It argues that the point of the First Amendment
61
is to promote the good of religion ....
58. Cf Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes about Equality, 96 COLuM. L.
REV. 1, 63-70 (1996); David E. Steinberg; Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40
EMORY L.J. 77 (1991). See also Lupu, A General Theory, supra note 40, at 367 ("[S]ect
specific accommodation bears a strong resemblance to the race-conscious affirmative action
programs that the Court has viewed with increasing disfavor.").
59. See John H. Garvey, All Things Being Equal..., 1996 BYU L. REV. 587, 604-09
[hereinafter Garvey, All Things]; Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument, supra note 38, at 288.
60. See Garvey, All Things, supra note 59, at 604.
61. Garvey, All Things, supra note 59, at 609.
[T]he religious justification is the only convincing explanation for the split-level
character of free exercise law. Sometimes religious believers and nonbelievers are
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I confess that part of me finds Garvey's argument very appealing. His is
the work of someone who believes deeply in the value of religion, who
understands what it is like to try to live a religious life in a hostile or indifferent
secular world. The most positive influence for good in my own life has been
my faith, and I want to believe that this good is something that is only worked
by religion.
But I can't quite believe this. In preparing this paper, I read a recent essay
by Professor Laycock. At the end of his essay, Laycock discloses that he is an
agnostic who once held unflattering opinions about believers.62 He then makes
a remarkable and moving statement: "I went through my period of hostility to
theistic religion, went through my period of stick figure caricatures of
believers, and I learned better," writes Laycock. 63 As a result of his frequent
contact with believers in the course of his work on behalf of free exercise
claimants, he confesses,
I learned that highly intelligent and accomplished people are devout
believers-indeed, they believe that they have personally experienced the
presence of God. I learned that believers reason just as well as nonbelievers on average, and that most believers do not see the conflict between faith
and reason .... I learned that religious faith is a powerful force for good
in the lives of many believers. I learned that the great religious traditions
often embody accumulated wisdom, whatever its sources and whatever
the
64
accumulated baggage of positions that seem to me mistaken.
I have found that this same softening of the heart occurs from the other
direction. Religious people are often too quick to demonize atheists, agnostics,
humanists and others with secular moral commitments. As Laycock changed
his views of believers, my time in this area has changed my views of nonbelievers. I have seen many of my friends and colleagues whose faith in God is
tenuous or nonexistent exhibit qualities of morality, integrity, caring, and
friendship that are as deep and as genuine as these qualities are in those who
are motivated by faith. Though I find Garvey's argument personally appealing,
my experience does not permit me to believe that religion and religious people
hold the monopoly on moral conduct that would justify the extraordinary
protection-bestowed by religious exemptions. As good as I believe God is, I
treated alike, but sometimes the law protects only religious believers. This is not
something that we can explain by appeals to consent and fairness. It violates the
canon of reciprocity. The only convincing explanation for such a rule is that the law
thinks that religion is a good thing.
Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument, supra note 38, at 29 1.
62. See Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 18, at 353-54.
63. Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 18, at 354.
64. Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 18, at 354-55.
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do not believe that this argument can work as a persuasive justification for
differential protection of religious practice and secular moral action in a
morally pluralistic society like the contemporary United States.

m.

THE IMPROBABILITY OF A DEFENSIBLE JUSTIFICATION:
THE RHETORICAL POWER OF EQUALITY

The likelihood of developing a persuasive account of religious exemptions
depends to a large extent on whether free exercise and establishment clause
rights are classified as liberty rights or equality rights. Equality rights generally
prevent government from imposing a burden on one person unless it imposes
the burden on everyone. Liberty rights generally prevent the state from
imposing the burden at all, even if it imposes it on everyone. What follows are
sketches of various doctrinal combinations of free exercise and establishment
interests, alternately conceived as liberty rights and equality rights.
A.

Separationism: Establishment and Free Exercise as Liberty Rights.

Under this doctrinal type, the establishment clause protects a freedom
from noncoercive government influence to adhere to a particular sect or to
support religion generally. The free exercise clause as liberty protects freedom
from coercive government action that prevents a person from acting in
accordance with her faith, or which directly and affirmatively forces a person
to adhere to a faith.
Separationism was characteristic of the religion clause jurisprudence of
the 1960s and 1970s. Under the establishment clause, most government action
that helped or encouraged religion, such as religious teaching and voluntary
prayer in public schools 65 and financial aid to religious elementary and
secondary schools, 66 was declared unconstitutional. Under the free exercise
clause, the exemption doctrine insulated religious practice burdened by
government action.~67 Some commentators even argued a quid pro quo: The
special disabilities imposed on religion under the establishment clause justified
the special protections granted religion under the free exercise clause.68
65. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 599
(1962). See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948).
66. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971). But see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
67. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
68. See Abner Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611
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Benevolent Neutrality: Establishment as an Equality Right, Free
Exercise as a Liberty Right.

When understood as an equality right, the Establishment Clause demands
government neutrality with respect to religion: Religion is not to be denied
access to government benefits that are otherwise freely available to all, nor is
it to shoulder government burdens that are not otherwise imposed on all. When
combined with a liberty conception of the Free Exercise Clause, Benevolent
Neutrality yields a government stance with respect to religion that does not
directly or overtly encourage it, but that at the same time is not so strictly
neutral that it impedes the ability of religion to grow and flourish in American
society. This was the doctrine of the 1980s, when the Supreme Court began
to permit close identification of religion and government, 69 as well as aid to
religion pursuant to programs of general government assistance,7 ° while leaving
the exemption doctrine at least formally in effect.7" After upholding a wideranging religion-specific exemption in 1987, however, the Court retreated from
religious exemptions in 1989.72 Benevolent Neutrality is the doctrinal
combination to which we would return if religious exemptions were reinstituted
without substantial change in establishment clause doctrine.
C.

Formal Neutrality: Establishment and Free Exercise as Equality
Rights.

Understood as an equality right, the free exercise of religion protects
against government discrimination on the basis of religion, but does not protect
against burdens imposed on religious practice as the incidental effect of facially
neutral government action. This is the doctrine of the 1990s, beginning with

(1993). See also Lupu, A General Theory, supra note 40, at 362 ("Religion is entitled to unique
constitutional respect, but it must suffer unique constitutional disability.").
69. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 581 (1989); Lynch v. Donelly, 465 U.S.
665 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981). But see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).

70. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Department for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). But see Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985) (overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997)); Grand Rapids Sch.
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997)).
71. See Frazee v. Department of Empl. Sec., 429 U.S. 929 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Comp. Appeals Comm'n., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981). But see Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
72. Compare Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) with
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). See also Estate of Thomton v. Caldor, Inc.,
472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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Smith under the Free Exercise clause,73 and continuing the further development
of establishment clause equality.74
It should be immediately apparent that of these three doctrinal paradigms,
Benevolent Neutrality is the most problematic, because it exhibits a rhetorical
imbalance. It seems intuitively appropriate that religion might be granted
special protection under the Free Exercise Clause as compensation for special
disabilities imposed under the establishment clause, as under Separationism.
Formal Neutrality is similarly plausible: When no special disabilities are
imposed on religion under the establishment clause, it receives no special
protection under the free exercise clause.7 5 From the standpoint of nonbelievers, however, Benevolent Neutrality's combination of establishment equality
and free exercise liberty has a "heads I win, tails you lose" bias in favor of
religious practice: The Establishment Clause does not require that religious
individuals and organizations be uniquely deprived of public benefits otherwise
73. See 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See also Church of the Lakumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
74. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985) & Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol Square Rev. & Adv. Comm. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.-S. 1 (1993); Board of Educ.
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
The principle of 'no content discrimination' fits well with the equal treatment
approach to the Religion Clauses, and both reflect the modem emphasis on equality
in constitutional adjudication....
Employment Division v. Smith and the abandonment of Lemon represent, in
part, a movement away from robust interpretations of the two Religion Clauses,
under which religion must be treated as special (either in receiving exemptions or
in not receiving aid), and toward principles of equal treatment and legislative
discretion.
Greenawalt, supra note 48, at 390.
A fourth logically possible combination would be establishment clause liberty and free
exercise equality, which implies a general governmental hostility toward religion in all its
interactions with government. This combination has never had much influence in the United
States.
75. Professor Berg is correct that even the weakest interpretation of the establishment
clause would prevent government from expressly favoring one religious denomination over
another, whereas government is free to favor one secular philosophy over another. Berg, supra
note 17, at pt. I. In other words, government may expressly endorse capitalism or
environmentalism, but not Catholicism or Mormonism. However, this would justify only the
very narrow range of free exercise exemptions necessary to give religious institutions the
freedom to promote their unique spiritual perspectives, as a kind of ideological compensation
for the fact that they are constitutionally prohibited from competing for government
endorsement in the way that secular philosophies may. See Ira C. Lupu, Why Congress Was
Wrong and the Court Was Right-Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 789, 805 (forthcoming 1998); cf Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327 (1983).
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generally available to all, yet the Free Exercise Clause requires that religious
individuals and organizations be uniquely relieved of legal burdens otherwise
generally imposed upon all. 76
While it may make intuitive sense for the religion clauses to protect either
religious liberty or religious equality, that intuition begins to fade when it is
urged that the clauses sometimes protect religious equality, and sometimes
protect religious liberty, and it disappears altogether when it is argued that the
clauses protect equality in case of religious benefits, and liberty in case of
religious burdens. In short, a society committed to individual equality cannot
explain why believers should be deprived of benefits or relieved of77burdens
which are equally distributed and fully justified on secular grounds.
The rhetorical power of equality is evident in contemporary constitutional
scholarship.78 One sees the pull of the egalitarian norm even in the work of
those who support exemptions. Professor Lupu, for example, advocates a
narrow doctrine of exemptions in his work in the religion clauses, but he would
extend his exemptions for religion to comparable secular interests. 79 Professor

Laycock makes a similar theoretical move, arguing in favor of an exemption
doctrine that is formally available only to protect actions motivated by religious
belief, but which in practice protects actions motivated by secular beliefs,
through an expansive definition of "religion" which includes agnostic and
atheistic beliefs.8 0 Dean Smith argues for a notion of "conscience" which
would similarly expand the protection of exemptions beyond traditional
religious practices.8 Even Michael McConnell, perhaps the most prominent
current defender of Benevolent Neutrality, concedes that released time
76. See, e.g., Jane Rutherford, Equality as the PrimaryConstitutional Value: The Case
for Applying Employment DiscriminationLaws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1104
(1996) ("The state has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination. What, then, is so
special about religious freedoms that religious employers are permitted to exceed the limits of
tolerance set for all others?").
77. I develop this thesis in detail in GEDICKS, supra note 16, ch. 6; Frederick Mark
Gedicks, The Improbabilityof Religion Clause Theory, 27 SEToN HALL L. REv. 1233 (1997).
78. See Rutherford, supra note 76, at 1060-76 (arguing that equality has long been the
most fundamental constitutional value). See also Lupu, A General Theory, supra note 40, at
362 ("'[E]quality' or 'nondiscrimination"' resonates with "the constitutional ethos of the late
twentieth century.").
79. See Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, supra note 21, at 778-79; Lupu, A
General Theory, supra note 40, at 384.
80. Professor Laycock defends his expansive definition by maintaining that the current
conflict between religious believers and nonbelievers is merely the contemporary version of the
Reformation conflict between Protestants and Catholics, and thus still falls within the historic
purposes of the religion clauses. See Laycock, Religious Liberty, supranote 18, at 326-37, 33839; Laycock, Continuity and Change, supra note 4 1, at 1069-89.
81. See Rodney K. Smith, Convertingthe Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute
with a Little Conscience, 1996 BYU L. REv. 645, 662-75.
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programs that permit religious instruction during the public school day are
more easily defended under the Establishment Clause if they allow children to
be released for nonreligious as well as religious purposes.8 2 While these
scholars maintain a doctrinal commitment to exemptions, they implicitly admit
the force of the egalitarian objection by expanding the scope of exemptions far
beyond traditional understandings of religious practice.
IV. CONCLUSION: PROTECTION WITHOUT EXEMPTIONS?

As I was finishing this essay, there arrived on my desk a law journal
symposium issue ominously entitled, "Does Religious Freedom Have a
Future?: The First Amendment after Boerne." 3 The tone of this question is
indistinguishable from that of most scholarly commentary in the immediate
aftermath of Smith itself " The assumption is that religious freedom and
religious exemptions are tied together in a binary relationship: Exemptions =
religious freedom; no exemptions = no religious freedom.
For too long debates about free exercise doctrine have been framed by this
all-or-nothing proposition that meaningful religious freedom is only possible
with exemptions. The myopic focus on restoration of the exemption doctrine
has obscured other possible readings of Smith that, given the current doctrinal
and political climate, may have far greater potential for the protection of
religious freedom than the quixotic effort to restore the exemption doctrine.
There has been virtually no effort at developing an intermediate position
between the emphatically rejected exemption doctrine and the rubber-stamp
rational basis review which this rejection seems to have left in its place.8 5
This is not because alternative readings of Smith are not possible. For
example, while the Court correctly maintains that the exemption doctrine was
a constitutional aberration, its suggestion that rejection of the exemption
doctrine restored doctrinal normality is demonstrably untrue.86 The Smith
doctrine does not resemble the structure of either liberty rights under the speech
clause of the First Amendment or equality rights under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Whereas Smith merely requires that
laws which incidentally burden religious conduct have a rational basis, 88
82. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36.
83. 2 NEXUs I (Fall 1997).
84. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. I.
85. See Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, supra note 21, at 758 ("[M]ost free
exercise claims will be summarily rejected with citation to and brief discussion of Smith.").
86. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. See also Boerne, 107 S. Ct. at 2161.
87. I develop this thesis in detail in Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free
Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities(forthcoming Apr. 9, 1998).
88. See 494 U.S. at 885 (holding that incidental burdens on religious practice are not
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Speech Clause doctrine generally requires that laws which burden expression
as an incident to otherwise legitimate regulation of conduct satisfy a higher
level of scrutiny. 9 In case of content-neutral government regulation of the
time, place and manner of expression in public forums, Speech Clause doctrine
additionally requires a close relationship between means and end, and adequate
alternative channels of communication."
All the attention on the restoration of exemptions, however, has relieved
the Court of the need to defend rational basis review of incidental burdens on
religion, and diverted attention from the opportunity to develop alternative
standards of review within the nonexemption framework set out by Smith.
Obviously, even the modestly heightened scrutiny of incidental burdens
represented by the O'Brien standard would be better than the deferential
rational basis review apparently left by Smith: a requirement analogous to the
test applied to time, place, and manner regulation in public forums-say, that
incidental burdens on religious practice must leave open ample alternative
means and places such practice--would be a substantial improvement. 9'
A similar argument can be made under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although most applications of heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause are the result of government classification
on suspicious grounds like race or gender,92 one branch of equal protection
applies heightened scrutiny to nonsuspect classifications which nevertheless
prevent or burden the exercise of fundamental rights explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution.93 It can be argued that a law that contains one
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny). See also id. at 888 ("[W]e cannot afford the luxury of
deeming presumptively invalidas applied to the religious objector every regulation of conduct
that does not protect an interest of the highest order.") (emphasis in original).
89. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (government regulation of
conduct that incidentally burdens freedom of expression is constitutionally valid if it furthers
an "important or substantial governmental interest," is "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression," and is "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest").
90. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983); Heffron
v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981).
91. Cf Lupu, A General Theory, supra note 40, at 378 (noting that in most instances
alternatives to religious practice prohibited by generally applicable law do not exist);
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 18, at 692 (same).
92. See Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216-17 (1982); United States v. Carolene Prods., Inc.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
93. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (distinction
between owners and nonowners of real property in determining eligibility to vote held
unconstitutional burden on fundamental right to vote in state elections); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (distinction drawn between longtime residents and new residents for
purposes of determining eligibility for welfare benefits held unconstitutional burden on
fundamental right to travel) (overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974));
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or more secular exemptions but no religious exemptions should trigger this
"fundamental rights/equal protection analysis," because the effect of the secular
exemptions is to classify individuals in such a way that some of them are
deprived of the fundamental right to the free exercise of religion.
"Fundamental rights/equal protection" analysis was highly controversial
because it gave to the Court the unconstrained power to recognize and enforce
unenumerated constitutional rights.9 Its application to protect an enumerated
right like the free exercise of religion, however, would be less problematic.95
In my view, the historical moment for exemptions has come and gone.
There no longer exists a plausible explanation of why religious believers-and
only believers-are constitutionally entitled to be excused from complying
with otherwise legitimate laws that burden practices motivated by moral belief.
Without such an explanation, exemptions face a doubtful future in the Supreme
Court. I suggest that those who value religious liberty make a virtue of
necessity by abandoning the effort to restore exemptions and looking elsewhere
for more fruitful means of protecting religious freedom. Some protection of
religious free exercise is better than none at all.

Harper v. Virginia Rd. of Elects., 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth distinction drawn by state poll
tax held unconstitutional burden on fundamental right to vote in state elections); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (distinction between violent and nonviolent felonies for
purpose of determining criminals to be sterilized held unconstitutional burden on fundamental
right of procreation).
94. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 72-73, 90-91 (1990).
95. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (limiting
fundamental rights/equal protection analysis to classifications that prevent or burden the
exercise of rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution"). It is clear from the
decisions cited as authority that the San Antonio majority believes the right to travel, the right
to vote in state elections, and the right to privacy to be the only implied fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. See id. at 34 nn.73-76, 35 n.78.

